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NOTE
THE TOMPKINS DECISION AND RULE 8(c) OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEEDURE
An interesting question has arisen because of the apparent conflict
between the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Under the Tompkins decision the federal courts are bound to follow state law in matters of substance. On
the other hand the Federal Rules, which the federal courts are likewise bound to follow, have attempted to deal with certain matters as
procedural. The question then is, what of a situation where under state
law certain matters have been declared to be matters of substance and
the same matters are dealt with in the Federal Rules as matters of
procedure? Which is to prevail, the state law or the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure?
Question of contributory negligence, statutes of limitations and
statutes of fraud are illustrative situations in which this conflict is
likely to arise.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8(c), these three
matters are treated as matters of affirmative defenses and as merely
procedural, but in some states, as shown later, these matters are recognized as matters of substance, going to the rights of the parties. The
present inquiry will be as to how the federal courts, under rule 8(c),
have handled situations where under state law contributory negligence,
statutes of frauds, and statutes of limitations are treated as matters of
substance.
An examination of the question of contributory negligence shows
that it is generally regarded to be a matter of affirmative defense, the
proof of which rests upon the defendant in the action.' It is apparent
then that there is no conflict here with Federal Rule 8(c) in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. However some states hold
that contributory negligence is not a matter of affirmative defense, but
is a matter from which the plaintiff must affirmatively prove himself
U.S. 63, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L.ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following sec. 723c.
3 Rule 8(c)--"Affirmative Defenses. In a pleading to a preceding pleading, a
party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by
fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,
1304

statutes of limitation, waiver and any other matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense . . . "
4Restatement of Torts, sec. 477 (1934) "The burden of establishing the plaintiff's contributory negligence rests upon the defendant."
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free before he is entitled to recover. 5 Illustrative of state cases holding
that contributory negligence is a matter of substance are Sandersonv.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 6 and Mazello v. Chicago City Ry. Co."
In the former it is said, ".. . The burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff not only to show the negligence of the defendant upon which liability is predicated, but also that the injured person was free from any
negligence on his part contributing to the injury . . ." In the latter it
was stated, ". . . failure to aver and prove freedom from contributory
negligence precludes a recovery.. ." Thus it would seem that proof by
the plaintiff that he was free from contributory negligence goes to his
right of recovery in these states. It is difficult to see how a fact essential to the plaintiff's recovery could be regarded as anything but a
matter of substance, it going to the very right of his cause of action.
If additional authority is needed to show that the plaintiff's necessity
of proving himself free from contributory negligence is a matter of
substance we have only to look to the case of Central Vermont Ry. v.
Whites which held, "But it is a misnomer to say that the question as
to the burden of proof as to contributory negligence is a mere matter
of state procedure. For in Vermont and in a few other states, proof of
plaintiff's freedom from fault is a part of the very substance of his
case. . . . In those states the plaintiff is as much under the necessity
of proving one of these facts (that defendant is guilty of negligence
and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence) as the other;
and as to neither can it be said that the burden is imposed by a mere
rule of procedure, since it arises out of a general obligation imposed
upon every plaintiff to establish all of the facts necessary to make out
his cause of action."
5 Wright v. Godin, 108 Vt. 23, 182 Atl. 189 (1936) ; Crichton v. Barrow Coal
Co. Inc., 100 Vt. 460, 139 Atl. 252 (1927); Ward v. City Fuel Oil Co., 2 So.
(2d) 586 (Florida, 1941); Silvia v. Caizz, 7 Atl. (2d) 704 (Rhode Island,

1939) ; Spooner et al. v. Wisecup et al., 227 Iowa 768, 288 N.W. 894 (1939) ;
Denny v. Augustine, 223 Iowa 1202, 275 N.W. 117 (1937); Kehm v. Dilts,
222 Iowa 826, 270 N.W. 388 (1936); Smith v. City of Hamburg, 212 Iowa
1022, 237 N.W. 330 (1931) ; Sanderson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 167 Iowa
90, 149 N.W. 188 (1914) ; Grummel v. Decker et ux., 294 Mich. 71, 292 N.W.
562 (1940); Pulford v. Mouw, 279 Mich. 376, 272 N.W. 713 (1937); Grubman v. City of N. Y., 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 757 (1941); McLoughlin v. Bonpark
Realty Corp., 23 N.Y.S. (2d)

156 (1940); Walheim v. City of Batavia, 12

N.Y.S. (2d) 228 (1939); De Nisi v. 3. Grugman Co. Inc. et al., 10 N.Y.S.
(2d) 681 (1939); Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E.
112 (1929); Wright v. Palmison, 260 N.Y.S. 812 (1932); Segal v. Chicago

City Ry. Co., 256 Ill. App. 369, 171 N.E. 922 (1930) ; Foreman Bank v. Chicago
Rapid Transit Co., 252 Ill. App. 151 (1929); Penrod v. East St. Louis Ry.
Co., 197 Ill. App. 151 (1915); Morolewski v. McCurrie, 205 Ill. App. 551
(1917); Benner v. East St. Louis & Suburban Ry. Co., 207 Il. App. 544
(1917); Mazello v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 207 Ill. App. 15 (1917) ; Gustavson
v. Hester, 211 Ill. App. 439 (1918).
6 167 Iowa 90, 149 N.W. 188 (1914).
7207 Ill. App. 15 (1917).
8 238 U.S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865, 59 L.ed. 1433 (1915).

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

An examination of the federal cases since the Tompkins case and
the promulgation of the Federal Rules shows that in the few instances
in which the question has arisen in the federal courts, they have been
inclined to adopt a similar stand, when acting in states holding contributory negligence to be a matter of substance. 9 For example in
Schopp v. Muller Dairies,10 the court, faced with the fact that under
New York law the burden of proving contributory negligence is upon
the plaintiff, said, ".

.

. in view of the decisions in Erie Railroad Co. v.

Tompkins and Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White the conclusion is
inescapable that the burden of proof as to contributory negligence is
not merely a matter of procedure, but is a matter of substance." The
court therefore applied the law of New York.
However the federal courts have not ben unanimous in their choice
of applying the Tompkins rule in place of the Federal Rule 8(c).
Sierocinski v. E. L Du Pont De Nemours," for example, held: "In
the federal courts the rule is that freedom from contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in a personal injury case need not be
negatived or disproved by him." The strongest argument presented by
the federal courts holding this question to be governed by Federal Rule
8(c) rather than the Tompkins decision is that Congress has the power
to authorize the Supreme Court to adopt and promulgate general rules
regulating procedure for the federal courts, and when Congress does
so act the rule is exclusive. The Supreme Court acting under this
authority has adopted such rules and by rule 8(c), declaring contributory negligence to be a matter of affirmative defense, in effect has
2
declared it to be a matter of procedure.'
This argument seems to be met and overcome in the case of Francis
v. Humphrey,3 "If said rule 8(c), a strictly procedural rule, be interpreted and applied so as to abridge or modify the substantive rights of
the plaintiff in this case, as established by the law of Illinois, the rule
thus interpreted and applied is necessarily unauthorized and void."
The court continues, "My conclusion is that the absence of contributory negligence is made an essential part of the plaintiff's cause of
action by the substantive law of Illinois and this substantive rule
declared by the courts of Illinois must be recognized and followed by
the federal courts. Being substantive law neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court has power to declare it to be other than the courts
9 Sampson v. Channel, 110 F. (2d) 754 (C.C.A. 1st, 1941) ; Francis v. Humphrey,
25 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Il1., 1938); Schopp v. Muller Dairies, 25 F. Supp. 50 (E.D.
N.Y. 1938); Fort Dodge Hotel Co. v. Bartelt, 119 F. (2d) 253 (C.C.A. 8th,
1941).
10 Supra, note 9.
1125 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Penn., 1938).
12 Kellman v. Stotz, 1 F.R.D. 726 (N.D. Iowa, 1941).
13 Francis v. Humphrey, 25 F. Supp. I (E.D. I1., 1938).
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of Illinois have established it nor to undermine or destroy it by procedural requirements."
Thus the sounder rule would seem to be that when federal courts
are acting in states holding the plaintiff responsible for proving himself free from contributory negligence they should regard the matter
as one of substance and under the Tompkins decision apply the state
law, in place of rule 8(c).14
Under Federal Rule 8(c) statutes of limitations are also listed as
matters of affirmative defense, and are treated as matters of procedure.
They are so regarded by some states.15 However a bald statement that
statutes of limitations are to be regarded as merely procedural would
be incorrect, for although this statement is true with respect to general statutes of limitations, an important exception is recognized. This
is that when a state statute not only creates a right but puts a time limit
upon the duration of that right, the statute is not regarded as something merely remedial but is regarded as pertaining to the right or
substance of the cause of action. 1 The most common example of such
statute is death statutes which not only create a right unknown at common law, but also create a means of extinguishing such a right.Y
When a federal court is faced with this type of statute of limitation, what is it to adopt as its norm, the Federal Rule or the state rule?
If the former it will have to treat the statute as merely procedural; if
the latter, as substantive. While this question has not been squarely
before the federal courts since the Tompkins case and the enactment
of the Federal Rules, it is interesting to note that the Federal Courts
also recognize this distinction between general statutes of limitations
and statutes which both create and limit the right' 8 In Kaplan v. ManOn the other hand in Haefer v. Herndon, the court is discussing stathattan Life Ins. Co., in speaking of general statutes of limitations, the
court said, "according to the established rule, a limitation on the time
of a suit is procedural and is governed by the law of the forum."'1
14 See also as to this problem, Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 601 (1934) ;
Tobin v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 100 F. (2d) 435 (C.C.A., D.C. 1938); McDonald
et al. v. Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 31 Supp. 298 (D. Conn., 1940) ; Sibback v.
Wilson & Co. Inc., 108 F. (2d) 415 (C.C.A. 7th, 1939).
15 Alropa Corporation v. Kirchwehn, 138 Ohio St. 30, 33 N.E. (2d) 655 (1941);
Hood v. Commonwealth Trust & Savings Bank, 376 Ill. 413, 34 N.E. (2d)

414 (1941).

61 S.W. (2d) 933 (1933); Kirsch v. Lubin,
131 Misc. 700, 228 N.Y.S. 94 (1927) ; Pringle v. Gibson, 135 Me. 297, 195 Atl.'
695 (1937); Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.'
(2d) 455 (1940) ; Norman v. Baldwin, 152 Va. 800, 148 S.E. 831 (1929).

16 Carter v. Burns, 332 Mo. 1128,

17Tinsley et. al. v. Mills, 36 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Louisiana, 1940).
Godfrey T. Cabot Inc. v. J. M. Huber Corporation, 35 F. Supp. 373 (N.D.

Texas, 1940); Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc. v. Volentine, 64 F. (2d) 800
19

(C.C.A. 5th, 1933).

Kaplan v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 109 F. (2d) 463 (C.C.A., D.C., 1939).
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On the other hand in Haefer v. Herndon, the court in discussing statutes which both create the cause of action and limit the time in
which such action might be brought said, "It is the local law that determines the substantive rights of the parties and when a limitation is
placed upon the assertion of that right, it has been correctly held to be
a matter of substantive as distinguished from procedural law."20
Such decisions may be a basis for the federal courts' holding,
despite rule 8(c), that the limitations created by statute are matters of
substance. To hold them matter of procedure under the rule would
place the federal courts in the inconsistent position of declaring the
statutes matters of substance on one hand and treating them as matters of procedure on the other21
Statutes of frauds have been held to be matters of procedure and
matters of substance. There seems to be a fairly simple rule to guide
us here, if the statute has been patterned after the English statute of
frauds and reads to the effect that no action shall be brought on the
instrument unless the parties comply with the statute. In such case the
statute relates only to the remedy and is procedural. On the other
hand if the statute provides that the contract will be void unless the
requirements are complied with the statute is regarded as a matter of
substance.2 Quite a few states have statutes of this latter type 23 and
therefore it would seem permissible to class them as holding their statutes to be matters of substance.
Under Federal Rule 8(c) statutes of frauds are categorically
treated as matters of procedure. We have then a situation similar to
the one which exists in regard to statutes of limitations, namely that
there seems to be a general rule recognizing instances in which statutes
of frauds are regarded as matters of substance and yet no distinction
is made in rule 8(c), which declares all statutes of frauds to be simply
matters of procedure.
Until the conflict which has arisen in the respects discussed has
been squarely passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it seems that the federal courts must stand tottering on the fence.
From a purely logical viewpoint it seems almost necessary that the
federal courts hold these matters to be "of substance" notwithstanding
the Federal Rules. A failure to do so means recognizing the fact that
states do hold such matters to be of substance, and yet dogmatically
2o Haefer v. Herndon, 22 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. II., 1938).
21 See also as to this problem, Corpus Juris Secundum, Conflict of Laws, § 22,
p. 953; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 604-605.
22Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1, 242 N.W. 592 (1932); Wolfe v. Wallingford
Bank and Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 AtI. (2d) 146 (1938).
23Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 13417; Comp. Stat. of Neb. (1929) § 36-105;
Cahill's Consolidated Laws of N.Y. (1930) § 51-259; Comp. Stat. of Wyoming (1920) § 4719; Wis. STAT. (1941) 240.08.
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adhering to the Federal Rules and treating them as procedural matters,
despite the decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
The Hon. Charles E. Clarke, one of the framers of the rules, has
said that the whole question depends upon the point of view with which
the matter is approached. 24 He continues, "From the nature of the
Federal Rules and the manner of their adotion as a result of long study
and careful consideration, a strong presumption should be indulged in
that matters included in them as procedural are to be so held by the
court." Otherwise, he intimates, the Federal Rules will be endangered.
With the latter conclusion there can be no disagreement, but to adopt
the position that a presumption of regarding the matters treated in the
Federal Rules as procedural should be made, is to our mind to adopt
the view that notwithstanding the Tompkins case there still is opportunity for the federal courts to modify the substantive rights of
litigants.
It seems obvious that the Federal Rules should be clarified in order
to avoid conflict with the Tompkins decision, and to attain that uniformity which is the purpose of the Federal Rules.
ROBERT T. McGRw.

24

Clark, "The Tompkins case and the Federal Rules," 1 F.R.D. 417 (1940).

